

















































El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala count among today’s most violent countries of the world. 
Qualitative research has claimed that large-scale deportations of Central American convicts have 
played an important role for the spread of gangs and rampant violence in the region. Using a novel 
identification strategy, this paper provides the first econometric evidence for this hypothesis from 
the case of El Salvador. Regarding the dependent variable, the policy experiment of a truce between 
rivaling gangs in 2012 allows to single out gang-related killings from overall homicide rates. The 
explanatory variable exploits subnational variation in the exposure of migrant communities to 
exogenous conditions in the host country. Violence spilled over to migrants’ places of origin when 
migrant corridors developed around US destinations with high pre-existing levels of violent crime. 
The cross-sectional evidence is backed by panel data analysis dating back to 1999. The annual 
inflow of convicts translated into rising homicides mainly in those municipalities whose migrants 
were exposed to high pre-existing crime at destination, whereas deportations of non-convicts did 
not have the same effect. These finding are in line with evidence on the origin of Central American 
gangs in US cities and convicts’ return to their places of birth after massive deportations since the 
mid-1990s. 
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“We sent them children fleeing war and they returned gangs to a country that needed to construct 
peace” (Carlos Dada, Salvadoran journalist and writer)1 
I. Introduction 
Gang violence has become a major concern in Central America since the late 1990s. Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador are consistently ranked among the most violent countries of the world, 
with average annual homicide rates above 40 per 100,000 in Guatemala and above 60 per 
100,000 persons in Honduras and El Salvador over the last ten years, compared to a global 
average of around 5 (World Bank 2017). The murder rate in El Salvador stood at shocking 109 
per 100,000 habitants at its height in 2015, turning El Salvador into the most violent country of 
the world during that year. In 2017, more than 57% of Salvadoran citizens ranked delinquency 
and gangs as their most important concerns, above poverty, unemployment or the economy 
(Latinobarómetro 2017, 60). Social and economic costs to affected societies are huge. Recent 
waves in the emigration of unaccompanied minors from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador 
have been attributed to violence at places of origin (Clemens 2017). Although hard to assess in 
quantitative terms, studies have estimated that direct and indirect monetary costs of gang violence 
- due to money paid for extortions, the extra amount spent on security, and the lost income of 
people deterred from working, among others –lie between 11% of GDP (Acevedo 2008) and 16% 
of GDP (BCR 2016). 
El Salvador provides a unique laboratory for studying the effects of international migration on the 
spread of violence at origin. Civil war in the 1980s and subsequent out-migration rapidly 
transformed Salvadoran economy and society. In 2013, almost 2 million people of Salvadoran 
origin and 1.2 million Salvadoran-born - roughly a fifth of El Salvador’s population of 6 million - 
resided in the US (Pew 2015). Remittances sent by migrants to their families at home contributed 
to 17% of Salvadoran GDP in 2016 (World Bank 2017) and have been an important factor in 
reducing poverty, improving education outcomes, providing liquidity to the financial sector, and 
financing the current account deficit, among others (Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003; Anzoategui, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería 2014; Gammage 2006). On the dark side of international 
                                                
1 New York Times (Spanish edition), “El Salvador sacudido por un terremoto llamado Trump”, 
January 12th 2018, translated by author. 
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migration lies the spread of gang-related violence across Central America. Large part of the 
increase in homicide rates since the 1990s in El Salvador and other Central American countries is 
related to the activities of two rivaling gangs: The “Mara Salvatrucha” (MS 13) and the 18th street 
gang (M 18). Both originated on the streets of Los Angeles, Washington and other US metropoles 
that were home to large Salvadoran Diasporas, nourishing the suspicion that violence in El 
Salvador and other Central American countries today is rooted in countries’ migration histories. 
Qualitative research and journalistic investigations have emphasized the role that mass 
deportations of migrants with a criminal record in the US have played for the propagation of gang 
violence in El Salvador and ultimately in other Central American countries (see for example 
Arana 2005; Cruz 2013; Lineberger 2011; Maslin 2017; Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson 2009; 
Zuñiga Nuñez 2016). Rodgers et al. (2009, 20) suspect that Nicaragua remained spared from the 
same level of gang violence despite a large Diaspora in the US because its migrant communities 
were less exposed to US gang culture and therefore experienced much lower deportation rates 
from the United States. Hard evidence for such assertions is rare, though. In a cross-country 
panel, Blake (2014) studies the effect of deportations on crime and finds that deportations are 
correlated with homicide rates in countries of origin, with some evidence for a causal link, using 
an instrumental variable. At the country level, systematic statistical evidence is absent. To my 
knowledge, this paper provides the first econometric support to the hypothesis that today’s 
epidemic violence in Central Americas is rooted in countries’ migration history.  
The identification strategy exploits important geographic variation on key variables unique to the 
case of El Salvador. Regarding the dependent variable, the policy experiment of a truce that was 
brokered between rivaling gangs in prison in 2012 led to a temporary drop in homicide rates that 
allows separating gang-related killings from other homicides. Regarding the independent 
variable, subnational variation in destination choices of Salvadoran migrants created different 
levels of exposure to pre-existing rates of violent crime at destination. In Salvadoran 
municipalities whose migrant communities were exposed to already large pre-existing rates of 
violence in their host communities upon arrival, destination country violence contaminated 
migrants’ communities of origin, resulting in higher rates of gang-related violence today. This 
cross-sectional approach is complemented by panel data analysis at the municipal level for the 
years 1999 to 2016, that provides evidence on the underlying channel of transmission. Annual 
inflows of convicts translated into higher homicide rates in those municipalities whose migrant 
communities were exposed to high pre-existing levels of violent crime at destination. The same 
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effect is not observed for the inflow of non-criminals, providing additional support to the 
postulated hypothesis. By including municipality fixed effects, the panel data analysis also 
responds to the concern that migrants from more violent places of origin might have self-selected 
into more violent destinations in the US. In sum, although the role of local conditions in 
facilitating the spread of gangs is not denied, this research singles out an exogenous spark that 
existed in the form of young immigrants’ exposure to pre-existing rates of violent crime in the 
US. Destination violence spilled over to municipalities of origin where gangs flourished after 
deportees returned to their places of birth and recruited new members from among the local 
populations and prisons. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The following Chapter II recounts the history 
of migration and violence in El Salvador and assesses existing qualitative literature on the links 
between migration and violence at places of origin. Chapter III describes the data and methods 
applied. Chapter III presents estimation results for the cross-section of up to 255 Salvadoran 
municipalities. In chapter IV, these results are backed by panel data regressions on annual 
homicide rates at the municipal level from 1999 to 2015. Chapter V concludes with remarks on 
the policy implications of these findings and the potentially huge follow-up costs of deportation 
policies. 
II. The Roots of Gang Violence in El Salvador and Central America: 
Qualitative Evidence  
The history of El Salvador provides a unique opportunity for studying the relationship between 
international migration and home country violence. In 1992, the guerilla and the military 
government signed a peace accord that ended a decade of civil war that had taken a death toll of 
70,000 (Buergenthal 1994), the displacements of a quarter of the population and a deeply divided 
country that is still marking El Salvador’s political landscape of a two-party system from 
opposing ends of the political spectrum, representing the former military leaders on the right and 
the former guerilla on the left.  
The armed conflict had initiated a mass exodus in the 1980s, that was further intensified over the 
1990s and 2000s. At the onset of the civil war in 1980, international migrants constituted roughly 
2% of the Salvadoran population. By 1990, the share of foreign born Salvadorans in the US had 
risen to over 8%. By the time the civil war ended in 1992, many immigrants had built an 
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important web of community and organizational infrastructure that induced subsequent 
immigration, increasing its stock of international migrants to 14% by the year 2000 and to over 
18% of the total Salvadoran population in 2008 (see Figure 1). Foreign-born migrants from El 
Salvador in the US are today estimated at 1.2 million, or a fifth of the country’s population of 
roughly six million. While providing an escape valve to Salvadorans that helped to reduce 
poverty and improve living conditions of a large part of the population, out-migration also 
radically transformed El Salvador’s society and economic model (Gammage 2006).  The 
Salvadoran economy today is heavily dependent on out-migration and remittances that 
contributed to 17% of GDP in 2016 (World Bank 2017), a model that is threatened by 
increasingly stricter immigration rules in the US and forced returns of those without legal 
resident status. 
Salvadoran migrant communities often developed in urban areas, with the largest communities 
developing in the poorer urban districts of Los Angeles, Washington, New York and Houston 
(PEW 2015; MPI 2010). Vigil (Vigil 2010, 132f) describes how young Salvadorans that had 
arrived with their parents during the 1980s and 90s were initially attracted to existing Chicano 
and Latino gangs, but increasingly formed their own Salvador-based gangs, later joined by other 
Central Americans (cp. Cruz 2013). US prisons and Juvenile Detention Centers have been 
claimed to have played an important role in shaping a specific “Salvadoran” identity of gangs and 
their emancipation from older Latino gangs (see Howell and Moore 2010; Howell 2015; Dunn 
2007; C. Martínez and Sanz 2012a, 2012b for the creation of Salvadoran gangs in the US). Partly 
as a response to the involvement of immigrant population in drug trafficking and other illegal 
gang activities, large-scale deportations of Central Americans began in the mid-1990s. Removals 
intensified with passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) in 1996 that expanded the categories of undocumented immigrants subject to 
deportation and made it more difficult for them to get relief from removal (cp. Seelke 2011). 
Following the IIRIA act in 1996, any “alien” who served a longer-than-a-year sentence became 
subject to removal from the U.S. after completion of their prison term (Cruz 2013, 5). As a result, 
gang-members were directly sent from US jails to El Salvador. Ranking second only after 
Mexico, El Salvador registered an increasing number of deportations since the early 1990s (see 
Figure 2). Depending on the year, between a third and half of all deportees had some criminal 
background, mostly young adults that had grown-up and made criminal careers in US urban 
metropolis. Overall deportation rates increased further in the 2000s, including non-legal residents 
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both with and without prior criminal records. Over the entire 17-year period for which data is 
available (1997 – 2015), the US deported a total of 244 thousand Salvadorans. Of these, more 
than 90 thousand -roughly a third - had a criminal background. 
Public responses to the spread of gangs in El Salvador were complicated by the fact that 
Salvadoran authorities received no information on the legal background of returnees2. Hence, the 
Salvadoran state not only lacked the financial resources but was also deprived of the legal means 
for tracking deportees once they entered Salvadoran territory. In this context, scholars and 
journalists alike have repeatedly suggested that mass deportation of Salvadorans with a criminal 
record in the US lies at the root of Central America’s curse of gang violence today, by effectively 
exporting US gangs to Central America (e.g. Arana 2005; Maslin 2017; Seelke 2011). While it is 
true that juvenile gangs have a tradition that dates back to the time before mass deportations 
(Smutt and Miranda 1998), international migration and subsequent deportations radically 
transformed the landscape of Salvadoran gangs. Cruz (2013, 11) reports that in survey rounds 
undertaken by Cruz and Peña (1998) only 4% and 11% of interviewed gang members had 
actually been deported from the US. Yet, they had a large influence on the shape, character and 
growth of local gangs, not only in terms of cultural attributes, but also in terms of their inner 
organization and dynamics. Older native gangs were taken over by spin-offs of two dominant US 
gangs: The MS 13 and the 18th street gang (M18). Within these, deportees took leading roles and 
recruited new gang members from the streets and in prisons (e.g. Demoscopia 2007, Ranum 
2006). As Rodger et al. (2009, 19) say: “deportees reproduced the structures and behavior 
patterns that had provided them with support and security in the United States. They swiftly 
founded local clikas, or chapters, of their gang in their communities of origin; in turn, these clikas 
rapidly attracted local youths and either supplanted or absorbed pandillas”. In a context of weak 
statehood and weak law enforcement on the one hand, and high poverty and a lack of 
employment opportunities on the other hand, gangs and related violence flourished (Savenije 
2009; Savenije and Andrade-Eekhoff 2003). By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, homicide 
rates had reached levels not previously known. After the break-up of a temporary truce brokered 
                                                
2 Only in 2014, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security signed an 
agreement to expand a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program with Central 
American countries (Seelke 2011, 9; Cruz 2013)  
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in prison between rivaling gang members in 2012 (Ó. Martínez et al. 2012b), violence peaked in 
2015 with a homicide rate of 109 per 100,000, the highest in the world (World Bank 2017). 
Having started as a local phenomenon, MS13 and 18th street gang acquired a progressively 
transnational character and spread into neighboring countries and Mexico, posing a major 
security threat to the region. 
 
[Figure 1: Foreign Born Salvadorans in the US (in thousands), and their Share of Home Country 
Population, 1960-2008] 
 
[Figure 2: Annual Deportations of Salvadorans, 1997-2016] 
 
III. Data and Methods 
In order to demonstrate that migrants’ exposure to pre-existing violent crime at US destinations 
contaminated migrants’ places of origin, this paper relies on both cross-sectional and time-
variation in homicide rates at the level of Salvadoran municipalities. 
Modelling Cross-Sectional Variation in Gang-Related Violence 
The following cross-sectional model is estimated for 255 Salvadoran municipalities j for which 
data is available3: 
 eq.		1 	gangrelated	killings	1 = β4 +	β6exposure	US	violence1 +	β?Xpre921 + u1  
 
                                                
3 The regression below uses 255 out of a total of 262 Salvadoran municipalities. Seven 
municipalities dropped from the regression, either because no data on migrants were reported or 
because the migration channel could not be identified. Six Salvadoran municipalities have 
repeated names and could not be clearly assigned in the data. 
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In eq. (1), gangrelated	killings refers to an estimate of homicides attributed to gangs, whereas exposure	US	violence measures the average exposure of each municipality’s Diaspora to pre-
existing crime rates at US destinations. Xpre92 is a vector of pre-treatment control variables 
measured at the level of Salvadoran municipalities, β are the estimated coefficients and u is the 
usual error term. 
In order to distinguish the phenomenon of gang-related violence from overall homicide rates that 
may have other causes, the dependent variable proxies gang-related killings in each Salvadoran 
municipality j by exploiting the quasi-experiment of a truce4 that was brokered between rivaling 
gang members in Salvadoran prisons in march 2012 (Ó. Martínez et al. 2012a). Incarcerated gang 
leaders who still commanded the two dominant gangs from within prison were offered privileges 
against the promise to reduce killings. The truce brought average homicide rates considerably 
down to around 35 per 100,000 people between march 2012 and march 20136, halving the 
average rate of around 70 during the years before (see Figure 3). After the truce broke up in mid-
20137, homicides jumped to 109 per 100 thousand in 2015 (WDI), the highest rate ever registered 
in El Salvador, turning the country into the world’s most violent country in peace-time. Although 
the truce was not successful in suppressing gang-related violence over the longer term (post-truce 
homicide rates were higher than before) the policy experiment provides an opportunity to 
approximate gang-related violence at the level of municipalities as the difference between 
homicide rates during the truce (march 2012 – march 2013) and homicide rates before and after 
the truce. Figure 4 illustrates the estimate of the geographical distribution of gang-related 
violence in El Salvador, where darker shades indicate a stronger drop in homicide rates during 
the truce. The figure highlights considerable variation in the effects of the truce at the subnational 
level, with the strongest drops registered in the Central Western Zone. Data on homicide rates at 
the level of municipalities for the years 2009 to 2015 is based on information collected by the 
                                                
4 This approach has been applied similarly by Kilsi (2017) 
6 Own calculation based on homicide rates reported by the mesa tripartida. 
7 Although the truce was officially abandoned only in January 2015, the truces was already 
severely weakened after June 2013 (Valencia 2015). Calculations for the reduction in homicide 
rates is based on the period 03/2012 to 03/2013 during which homicide rates most visibly fell. 
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National Police, the Institute of Legal Medicine and the public prosecutor’s department (fiscalía) 
in El Salvador8. For the years 1999 to 2008, homicide data at the municipal level is taken from 
the statistical yearbooks of the Institute for Legal Medicine (Instituto de Medicina Legal de El 
Salvador. Anuarios Estadísticos). 
The rationale behind estimating an effect of migrants’ exposure to US violence is that gangs in El 
Salvador developed when migrant communities settled in urban areas with large pre-existing 
gang structures and other criminal activities. Once being returned to their places of birth, 
deportees brought gang practices, habits and criminal skills acquired abroad with them.  
In order to create an indicator for Diaspora’s exposure to US crime at the level of Salvadoran 
municipalities, the exposure to crime at destination is weighted by the size of Diasporas in US 
destination counties. Hence, for every municipality j the indicator measures calculates the 
average exposure of its migrant population to violent crime at destination counties k. Whereas 
data on the size of gangs at a local level is not available for the 1980s, incidents of violent crime 
including murder and non-negligent manslaughter, legacy rape, revised rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault are used as a proxy for the prevalence of gangs. Data for US crime statistics 
comes from the US Department of Justice-Federal Bureau of Investigation, via  US Census 
Bureau (2017)10. Data on migration corridors comes from the North American Integration and 
Development (NAID) Center at the University of California Los Angeles, who collected cross-
sectional data on migration corridors between El Salvador and the US up to the level of 
Salvadoran municipalities and US counties11. 
                                                
8 The National Police, the Institute of Legal Medicine and the public prosecutor’s department 
form the “mesa tripartida” (a tripartite commission) that provides the most reliable information 
on homicide rates at the municipal level. Data from the mesa tripartida were shared by Roberto 
Valencia from the online newspaper www.elfaro.net 
10 The average exposure of Salvadoran migrants to crime in the US was about 4-5 times larger 
than the average US crime rate (crime rates averaged over all US counties). This can be explained 
by the fact that Salvadoran migrants settled to a large degree in large cities.  
11 Data collection was completed in 2011 and used to be publicly available under 
https://gis.ats.ucla.edu/naid/. See Hinojosa (2011) for a description of the data and Anzoategui et 
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To mitigate the concern that crime rates at destination could themselves be affected by increasing 
immigration from Latin America since the 1990s, the earliest available year at the county-level 
will be used, which is 1981. Regressions below also evaluate the effect of different locations in 
the US, in particular Los Angeles, Washington D.C. and Long Island (New York). According to 
the sample on migration corridors, more than half of all emigrants were located in one of these 
three Metropolitan Areas12. With the exception of Long Island, all of them were characterized by 
intense gang activities in the 1980s and 1990s before Salvadoran emigrants arrived (Hagedorn 
2008; Howell 2015; Dunn 2007). Especially Los Angeles is often considered to be the “gang 
capital of the world” (Vigil 2010).  
Two additional destination variables are included in order to ensure that the contagion of US 
crime to municipalities of origin is not driven by other variables at destination. Average housing 
costs of new buildings at the level of US counties is a proxy for wealth and living costs at 
migrants’ destinations. In addition, the share of Latin origin population at destination measures 
the previous existence of a Latin American Diaspora. Both variables refer to the year 1980, prior 
to the arrival of Salvadorans (Construction Division of the US Census and the 1980 Population 
Census, via US Census Bureau (2017). In addition, the vector of cross-sectional control variables X92 includes a large number of variables related to social and demographic characteristics of 
municipalities. On the one hand, municipalities with a higher incidence of poverty and social 
exclusion might be more vulnerable to the spread of gang violence (Savenije and Andrade-
Eekhoff 2003; Savenije 2009), either because few employment opportunities lower the 
opportunity costs of becoming a gang member, or because social composition and cohesion may 
matter for how resilient a society is to gang violence. On the other hand, municipal level 
variables address eventual bias that may occur from self-selection into US destinations. For 
                                                
al. (2014) for an application to the creation of instruments using migrants’ population exposure to 
labor market shocks in the US. I am grateful to Jesse Acevedo for sharing the data. 
12 Similar to the data reported here, the Migration Policy Institute (2010) states that nearly two-
thirds of Salvadoran immigrants resided in only six metropolitan areas. In addition to those 
mentioned in the text, San Francisco, Dallas and Houston are other Metropolitan areas with 
considerable populations of Salvadoran immigrants. 
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example, emigrants from urban areas may have a preference for urban destinations in the US, that 
also tend to be characterized by higher levels of violent crime. 
Control variables for the cross-sectional model refer to the year 1992 when the first national 
census was carried out, shortly after the end of the civil war. This ensures that control variables 
are not themselves affected by gang violence spreading the country from the late 1990s onwards. 
The list of control variables includes average household size, population size (logged in the 
regression), and population density as controls for differences in demographic conditions. A 
measure on the share of households with at least one member above the age of 15 who does not 
know how to read or write is included as a measure of levels of human capital. A composite 
indicator of average housing quality on a scale between 0 and 1 captures differences in poverty 
levels, where higher values indicate worse housing quality. The indicator on housing quality 
gives equal weights to four binary housing measures, following definitions used in Digestyc 
(2015). In addition, regression control for the share of households in which children under the age 
of 15 were working. Two variables are related to levels of migration and remittances: The share 
of households in a municipality that reported emigrants, and the share of households who 
reported international remittances from migrants abroad. Levels of historical data on homicides at 
the municipal level are hard to get. Carcach (2008) made an effort of estimating municipal level 
homicide rates for earlier decades by evaluating homicides reported in the printing press. 
Although these estimates might be biased towards urban municipalities due to better press 
coverage, the data functions as a rough proxy for historical differences in violence across regions 
in El Salvador, controlling for longer historical trends and patterns. Logged historical homicide 
rates measure the average number of homicides per 100,000 as reported in the years 1965, 1975 
and 1995.  
 
[Figure 3: Monthly Homicide Rates per 100 thousand persons, 2009-2015] 
 
[Figure 4: Drop in Homicides During Truce, by Municipalities] 
 
The estimation of eq. (1) faces several methodological challenges. First, coefficients could be 
biased if violence in municipality j is also affected by violence in adjacent territories. Second, the 
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dependent variable of gang-related killings is left-truncated: 45 municipalities either reported no 
drop in violence or increases in violence during the truce. Third, the estimate of homicide rates is 
relatively imprecise for small municipalities, with populations as small as several thousand 
inhabitants in some cases. Indicators on the proxy of gang-related violence should be read with 
the caveat that this indicator is estimated with a larger error term in small municipalities. 
The paper addresses these issues in the following ways. First, regressions include precision 
weights (inverse variance matrix weights), that give a lower weight to municipalities with small 
population sizes, taking into account a weaker precision of homicide rates for these observations. 
Alternatively, results will be shown for subsets excluding municipalities below a critical 
population threshold. Second, as an alternative to ordinary least squares regression, the paper 
applies tobit maximum likelihood estimation in order to correctly model the left-censoring of the 
dependent variable. Third, in order to address the possibility of spatial correlation, the paper 
follows common practice in the literature on determinants of crime (e.g. Anselin et al. 2000; 
Baller et al. 2001) and evaluates the inclusion of a spatial lag parameter, that takes into account 
possible correlation of violence between k municipalities sharing a common border. Then, a 
binary weighting matrix is applied to the list of neighbors in order to identify spatial lags for each 
municipality j.  
Modelling Time Dynamics 
Results from the cross-sectional study are backed by an analysis of time-variation in homicide 
rates at the municipal level, covering the sixteen-years period ranging from 1999 to 2015 that was 
marked by an overall increase in homicide rates. Unfortunately, detailed data on deportees 
including their municipalities of birth is not available. However, interacting aggregate numbers of 
the annual inflow of deportees with characteristics of different migration corridors provides 
annual variation at the level of municipalities that permits examining several implications and the 
channel of transmission: If the hypothesis on a contagion of US violent crime along migration 
corridors via deportations is true, annual inflows of convicts should have a strong effect on 
homicide rates in municipalities whose Diaspora settled in high-crime environments in the US, 
and low effects in municipalities whose Diaspora settled in low-crime environments. At the same 
time, we should not see an effect of an inflow of non-convicts on homicides. Also, in line with 
eq. (1), we should observe a positive effect of an interaction of annual inflows of deportees with 
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high-crime exposure of migrants up the truce in march 2012, and a drop in homicide rates during 
the years of the truce (2012 and 2013).  
These hypotheses will be tested using the following linear panel model: 
 eq.		2 	homicides	1,F = 	G6inflow	convicts ∗ exposure	US	violence1,F + 	G?X1,F + 	KL +	MN + u1,F 
, 
where homicides refer to logged homicides per 100 thousand persons at time t in municipality j. G6is the main coefficient of interest, estimated from an interaction between the annual inflow of 
deported convicts and the average exposure of migrants from each municipality j to pre-existing 
violent crime at US destinations. Data on annual US deportation to El Salvador for are available 
from the US Department of Homeland Security, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics (see Figure 
2).  
Results below also show results for an interaction with the inflow of non-convicts, as well as an 
interaction with the years of the truce. Next to the year fixed effect KL that captures common time 
trends, the regression also controls for municipality fixed effects MN. Hence, all time-constant 
factors at the municipality level are controlled for, including geographical, institutional and other 
historical legacies that differ between municipalities. Municipality fixed effects MN reduce the 
potential threat to identification that may arise if unobserved variables explain both the self-
selection into US destination and the prevalence of gang-related killings today. 
Annual inflows of deportations are plausibly an exogenous variable, that should not be affected 
by regional variation in homicide rates within El Salvador. In addition to municipality fixed 
effects, the vector X is comprised of two time-varying controls at the level of municipalities. 
Population size is included as a measure of demographic factors that could be related to 
migratory movements, among others. In addition, the annual value added tax generated per capita 
at the level of municipalities controls for economic conditions. As above, u is the usual error 
term. Data on per capita value added tax generated at the level of municipality is available from 
the Secretary of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda de El Salvador, Dirección de Impuestos 
Internos). The population size at the municipality level is provided by the National Statistics 
Office (Digestyc 1996; Digestyc/UNFPA/CEPAL 2014). Like in the cross-sectional model, the 
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panel model in equation (2) is estimated using precision weights, taking account of the fact that 
homicide rates are measured with larger errors in small municipalities. 
See Annex 1 for a description of all variables and sources.  
IV. Cross-Sectional Evidence: Migrants’ Exposure to Violent Crime at 
Destination and Gang-Related Killings in El Salvador 
Table 1 summarizes regression output for the effect of migrants’ exposure to US crime rates on 
gang-related violence from ordinary least squares. Output based on tobit maximum likelihood 
estimation for left-censored variables and results from a spatial lag models are provided in the 
appendix. Since left-censoring and spatial lags hardly altered the results, results shown below 
focus on linear regression results due to its simplicity and easy interpretation20. 
Results in Table 1 are shown for six different specifications. The first column shows effects of 
migrants’ exposure to crime at destination on gang-related killings, without any additional 
controls. Colum 2 refers to a subset of municipalities with a population of at least 10,000 in 1992, 
reducing the sample by more than a half. Column 3 introduces department fixed effects and 
precision weights, addressing the lower reliance of estimates in small populations. Column 4 adds 
social and demographic controls from the 1992 household census plus a control for historical 
homicide rates. Column 5 additionally controls for destination characteristics (i.e. housing costs 
and share of Latin population). Column 6 excludes all municipalities that belong to the capital 
and largest city San Salvador. 
Social and demographic variables in 1992 do not show a clear pattern with respect to the 
prevalence of gang-related killings today: None of the variables is statistically significant. A 
moderate negative effect is found for levels of out-migration: Municipalities with a larger relative 
                                                
20 For technical reasons, the three methodological challenges mentioned above – left truncation, 
spatial correlation, and imprecise estimates for small municipalities – are addressed separately. 
One reason for focusing on the linear regression output with precision weights is that bias 
resulting from small sample bias turned out to be more relevant compared to truncation and 
spatial correlation. 
 15 
number of emigrants in 1992 have a lower level of gang-related violence today. This suggests 
that it is not migration as such that is related to violence. Population size enters with a negative 
sign, indicating that a larger drop in violence as a result of the truce was measured in small 
municipalities. Historical rates of violence are negatively correlated with gang-related killings. 
Partly, the negative sign should reflect an urban bias in the indicator based on crime reported in 
the printing press with better coverage of urban areas. With that limitation in mind, available data 
provides no evidence that historical rates of violence predict current rates of gang-related killings. 
The one variable that is strongly statistically significant in all regressions is Diasporas’ exposure 
to violent crime at destination. As expected, an exposure to more crime at destination is 
associated with larger rates of current gang-related homicides (i.e. a stronger reduction in 
homicides during the truce). Since the variable on exposure to US violent crime has been 
normalized, the coefficient indicates the expected level of gang-related violence in the most 
exposed compared to the least exposed municipality. The effect of migrants’ exposure is robust to 
excluding the smallest municipalities (column 2), the inclusion of pre-treatment municipality 
controls as well as other destination variables (columns 4 and 5), and the exclusion of the 
Metropolitan area of San Salvador (column 6). Giving a lower weight to small municipalities 
(precision weights in columns 3 to 6) increases the effect. Figure 5 visualizes output from Table 
1, by drawing the predicted level of gang-related violence from spec. (5) as a function of 
municipalities’ exposure to violent crime in the US with a 95% confidence interval. Larger 
circles refer to more populated municipalities, that are given a larger precision weight in the 
regression. Note that the model predicts negative values at the lowest range, a result of using 
linear regression on data that should be censored at the left. Since 95% of municipalities have 
values above .2 on the x-axis, the OLS predictions hardly differ from the truncated model for the 
range of interest. See Annex 2 for estimation results based on the tobit model for censored 
variables. 
 
[Table 1: Exposure to US Violence and Gang-Related Homicides (OLS)] 
 
[Figure 5: Exposure to US Crime and Predicted Gang Violence] 
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Table 2 shows results for several additional specifications. Column 1 repeats column 5 from 
Table 1 but adds several post-treatment variables: Average value added tax per capita raised over 
the years 2001 to 2012, population size in 2007, the poverty gap in 2005, and the share of 
households receiving remittances and the share of households with emigrants in 2007. Results are 
robust to the inclusion of these post-treatment variables. Column 3 also controls for the three 
main destinations of migrants in the US (New York, Washington and Long Island). The 
coefficient for exposure to US violent crime is hardly affected. The remaining columns 4 to 6 
provide estimated coefficients for each of the main destinations in the US separately. As 
expected, the sign for Long Island is negative (the destination with the lowest levels of violent 
crime in the 1980s) and the coefficient for Los Angeles is positive (the city with the strongest 
gang activities). However, none is statistically significant. What drives the result seems to be 
exposure to violent crime rather than the destination as such. 
 
[Table 2: Exposure to US Violence and Gang-Related Homicides (OLS, Alternative 
Specifications)] 
 
V. Evidence from Panel Data 
Several open questions remain from the cross-sectional analysis. For one, while establishing a 
correlation between migrants’ exposure to crime in the US and current gang-related violence, the 
actual channel of transmission - deportations of convicts -  is unobserved. Second, municipalities 
might self-select into more violent destinations in the US. Unobserved omitted variables may 
pose a threat to identification, if these explain both the self-selection into US destination and the 
prevalence of gang-related killings today. For example, migrants from urban municipalities might 
self-select into urban destination with large crime, but urban municipalities might also be more 
prone to criminal activities.  
In response to these concerns, this section provides additional evidence for the postulated 
hypotheses. For one, by analyzing time-dynamics of homicide rates over the period 1999 to 2015, 
homicide rates can be related to annual deportations. Total annual deportations (see Figure 2) are 
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calculated as rates per 100 thousand persons in the regression below21. Although the inflow of 
deportees towards specific municipalities is unknown, the interaction of aggregate deportations 
from the US to El Salvador with the exposure to US violent crime provides time-variation at the 
level of municipalities. As mentioned above, the inflow of convicts is expected to affect homicide 
rates primarily in municipalities with high exposure to US crime. Second, the inclusion of 
municipality fixed effects permits to control for all time-invariant variables that could be related 
to self-selection into migrants’ destination.  
Table 3 shows results from linear panel regressions with municipality and year fixed effects for 
seven specifications. The baseline regression in column 1 estimates the interaction between the 
inflow of convicts and the exposure to US violence from 1999 up to the truce in 2012. Column 2 
extends the sample to 2015, and includes an interaction of exposure to US violence with truce 
years. Column 3 adds precision weights. Column 4 adds controls (value added tax per capita and 
population size). Column 5 adds an interaction with the inflow of non-convicts. Column 6 
excludes the Metropolitan area of San Salvador. Column 7 is based on two-year intervals instead 
of annual data. 
 
[Table 3: Annual Deportations and Homicide Rates at the Municipal Level. Panel Results (OLS)] 
 
All results are as expected and confirm the pattern found in the cross-sectional analysis. The 
inflow of convicts translates into higher homicide rates in municipalities with a stronger exposure 
to US violent crime (column 1). In line with the cross-sectional analysis, the truce led to a drop in 
homicides in municipalities with a high exposure to violent crime in the US (column 2). The 
effect increases when the low precision of small population estimates is addressed via precision 
weights (column 3). Also including economic and demographic controls increases the effect of an 
inflow of convicts in municipalities with high exposure to US violent crime (column 4). In 
contrast, the coefficient for the interacted inflow of non-convicts has a much smaller size and is 
statistically insignificant in column 5. Excluding the Metropolitan area of San Salvador hardly 
                                                
21 Deportation rates per 100 thousand over the entire period ranged between 30 and 150 for 
convicts, and between 30 and 280 for non-convicts.  
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affects the outcome (column 6), whereas using two-year intervals instead of yearly intervals 
diminishes the size of the coefficients, but not their statistical significance (column 7). 
How many homicides can be attributed to the inflow of convicts? While the model does not 
identify an average effect of deportations on homicide rates, comparing effects of an inflow of 
convicts in municipalities with high and low exposure to US violence does provide some 
information on the magnitude of contagion. For example, based on column 4, we would expect 
one more homicide per 100 thousand persons in the most exposed municipality compared to the 
least exposed municipality, for an inflow of 10 additional convicts per 100 thousand persons. 
VI. Conclusion 
The two gangs that dominate violence in El Salvador – the MS 13 and the 18th street gang (M18) 
– originated in US cities. Previous qualitative research and journalistic investigations have 
claimed that deportations of convicted gang members who had mostly come as children of 
immigrants and were socialized into existing gang cultures at their places of arrival had a strong 
influence on the spread of gang violence in Central America. This paper adds the first 
econometric evidence to the hypothesis on violence contagion: The larger migrants’ exposure to 
pre-existing violence at destination, the more gang-related homicides at their places of origin. 
This observation is backed by an analysis of time-dynamics. The annual inflow of convicts 
translated into increasing homicide rates mostly in those municipalities whose migrants were 
exposed to high levels of violent crime at US destinations. The fact that the same is not observed 
for the inflow of migrants without a penal record in the US provides additional evidence for the 
contagion of violence via deported convicts.  
This is not a denial of country conditions that favored the spread of gang-related violence in 
Central America. Social exclusion, lack of employment opportunities, weak state capacities, and 
possibly a tradition of violence that dated back to the civil war and before posed fertile grounds 
for the extension of gangs and the recruitment of new members from among the local population. 
However, the goal of this research was to trace the roots of gang-related violence to El Salvador’s 
migration history and to single out an exogenous spark that consisted in migrants’ exposure to 
crime in the US.  
 19 
The Salvadoran experience bears important lessons for current debates on deportation policies in 
destination countries of immigrants. In the case of Central America, the huge long-term social 
and economic costs of deportation policies can hardly be assessed in quantitative terms. They 
pose a serious obstacle to the development of the affected countries and are the major cause of 
recent emigration waves from the Northern triangle in Central America (Honduras, Guatemala 
and El Salvador) to the US, particularly of unaccompanied minors (Clemens 2017). Whereas 
contexts may differ, this study should be read as a warning also against deportation policies in 
other countries and contexts. Parallels may exist, for example, to the forced return of suspected 
terrorists towards countries that may lack capacities and resources to control and contain criminal 
activities.  
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VII. Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Foreign Born Salvadorans in the US (in 
thousands), and their Share of Home Country 
Population, 1960-2008 
 
Source: Pew Research Center (2015) 
 
 
Figure 2: Annual Deportations of Salvadorans, 1997-2015 
 
The figure shows total annual deportations of Salvadorans from 
the US (grey bars) and, as a subset, those who had been 
convicted (dark grey bars). Source: US Department of 
Homeland Security, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, 
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Figure 3: Monthly Homicide Rates per 100 thousand persons, 2009-2016 
 
The figure shows annualized homicide rates per 100 thousand persons at the level of 
Salvadoran municipalities (light grey lines) and as an average over all municipalities 
(black line). The truce between rivaling gang members was brokered in march 2013 and 





Figure 4: Drop in Homicides During Truce, by Municipalities 
 
Darker shades indicate a higher drop in homicide rates during the truce between rivaling 
gangs (march 2012-march 2013). The drop in homicides rates is used as a proxy for the 
spatial distribution of gang-related homicides. The estimate less precise for small 































Table 1: Exposure to US Violence and Gang-Related Homicides (OLS) 
	 Estimated Gang Violence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(Intercept) 5.2 5.1 -40 310*** 210 210 
[9.2] [7.2] [34] [110] [140] [140] 
exposure US violence 74*** 70*** 160** 130** 120** 120** 
[26] [19] [80] [52] [53] [53] 
exposure housing 
costs 
    1.3 1.3 
    [1.6] [1.6] 
exposure Latin 
population 
    100 100 
    [160] [160] 
historical homicide 
rates 
   -6.2** -6.5*** -6.8*** 
   [2.5] [2.5] [2.5] 
analphabetism    91 110 110 
   [83] [84] [87] 
child work    150 160 160 
   [130] [130] [140] 
population size    -25*** -24*** -24*** 
   [7.6] [7.3] [7.2] 
population density    0.0044 0.0046 0.0089 
   [0.0058] [0.0059] [0.02] 
housing quality    -110 -110 -100 
   [69] [66] [67] 
household size    -19 -19 -19 
   [15] [14] [15] 
emigration    -210 -220* -220* 
   [130] [120] [120] 
remittances    190 190 190* 
   [120] [120] [120] 
department fixed 
effects 
no no yes yes yes yes 
sample full pop > 
10^3 
full full full excl. San 
Salvador 
degrees of freedom 253 112 240 227 225 207 
precision weights no no yes yes yes yes 
F-stat 22.33 12.29 7.85 9.91 9.26 8.94 
R^2 0.08 0.1 0.31 0.5 0.51 0.51 
adj. R^2 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.45 0.45 0.45 
 Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are given in squared brackets. The dependent variable 
is an estimation of gang-related killings, proxied by the drop in homicides during the truce 
between rivaling gang members. Stars denote statistical significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 





Figure 5: Exposure to US Crime and Predicted Gang Violence 
 
The figure draws the predicted effect of migrants’ average exposure to US violence 
(normalized) on gang-related killings, based on specification (5) in Table 1, with a 95% 
confidence interval. Larger circles refer to more populated municipalities, that are given a 
larger precision weight in the regression.  
 
  




















Table 2: Exposure to US Violence and Gang-Related Homicides (OLS, Alternative Specifications) 
	 Estimated Gang Violence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(Intercept) 280** 210 360*** 390*** 390*** 
[140] [150] [130] [130] [130] 
exposure US violence 92** 97**    
[42] [43]    
Los Angeles  -120 55   
 [90] [51]   
Long Island  9.8  -23  
 [58]  [48]  
Washington  69   -0.042 
 [46]   [37] 
exposure housing costs 1.1 1.9    
[1.4] [1.8]    
exposure Latin population 60 420*    
[150] [250]    
pre-treatment ctrls. (1992) yes yes yes yes yes 
additional ctrls. (2007) yes yes no no no 
department fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
sample full full full full full 
degrees of freedom 220 217 227 227 227 
precision weights yes yes yes yes yes 
F-stat 9.31 8.78 7.68 7.57 7.55 
R^2 0.56 0.57 0.44 0.43 0.43 
adj. R^2 0.5 0.51 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are given in squared brackets. The dependent 
variable is an estimation of gang-related killings, as described in the text. Additional 
post-treatment controls include an average of per capita value added tax paid in each 
municipality over the periods 2001 to 2012 (Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de 
Impuestos Internos), the share of household with emigrants as well as the share of 
households receiving remittances as reported in the 2007 census (Digestyc, Censo de 
Población y Vivienda 2007), and the 2005 poverty head count at the municipal level 
FISDL-FLACSO (2005). Pre-treatment controls refer to all controls included in 
Table 1, based on the 1992 census. Stars denote statistical significance at 10% (*), 





Table 3: Annual Deportations and Homicide Rates at the Municipal Level. Panel Results (OLS) 
	 Homicides per capita 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
exposure US violence*inflow of convicts 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.85* 1.2*** 0.75** 1.2*** 0.0086*** 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.46] [0.46] [0.32] [0.47] [0.0025] 
exposure US violence*truce  -66*** -130** -83** -59** -83** -64*** 
 [15] [54] [33] [25] [33] [16] 
exposure US violence*inflow of non-convicts     0.25   
    [0.2]   
value addec tax per capita    -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.011 -0.0042** 
   [0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0017] 
population size    -6e-04*** -6.10e-04*** -0.00073 -0.00023*** 
      [0.00023] [0.00023] [0.00051] [8e-05] 
municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
precision weights no no yes yes yes yes yes 
degrees of freedom 3555 4062 4062 3502 3501 3236 1746 
















T 14 14 14 16 16 16 8 
R^2 0.47 0.45 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.56 
adj. R^2 0.43 0.41 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.49 
F-stat 11.67 12.21 7.15 7.89 7.89 7.67 8.23 
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Annex 1: Data Description and Sources 
 
A) Cross-sectional data 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  Mean [s.d.] 
gang-related violence  Difference in homicide rates during the truce 
between rivaling gangs (03/2012 to 03/2013) and 
homicide rates before and after the truce (01/2009 
to 12/2015) c) 
 
 33 
  [32] 
exposure US violence  Average exposure of migrants from municipality j 
to crime rates at US destination county i, 
normalized to [0,1]. Crime rates are defined as 
violent crime known to police, including murder & 
non-negligent manslaughter, legacy rape, revised 
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Crime data at 
the US county level refers to 1981. a) b) 
 
 0.38 
  [0.13] 
Los Angeles  Share of migrants from each municipality j in Los 
Angeles county a) 
 0.22 
  [0.11] 
Washington  Share of migrants from each municipality j in the 
Washington D.C. area a) 
 0.19 
  [0.11] 
Long Island  Share of migrants from each municipality j in Long 
Island (counties Suffolk and Nassau) a) 
 0.087 
  [0.085] 
exposure housing costs  Average exposure of migrants from municipality j 
to housing costs at US destination county i. 
Housing costs are defined as valuation of new 
private housing units authorized by building permits 
1980 (in thsnd. USD) a) e) 
 
 50 
  [3.6] 
exposure Latin population  Average exposure of migrants from municipality j 
to the size of Latin origin population at US 
destination county i in the year 1980, measured as 
the share of Latin origin population of total 
population a) f) 
 
 0.12 
  [0.03] 
historical homicide rates  Homicide rates per 100 thsnd. as reported in the 
printing press, as an average over the years 1965, 
1975 and 1995 (logged in the regression) g) 
 
 23 
  [93] 
analphabetism  Share of households in 1992 in which at least one 
person at the age of 15 or higher does not know 
how to read or write d) 
 
 0.6 
  [0.13] 
child work  Share of households in 1992 with working minors 
under the age of 15 d) 
 0.073 
  [0.059] 
population density  Population density in 1992, defined as population 
size in 1992 per square kilometer d) 
 400 
  [1100] 
population size  Total population size of municipality in 1992 
(logged in the regression) d) 
 20000 
  [39000] 
housing quality  Averages of a composite indicator of housing 
quality from the 1992 census, gives equal weight to 
four binary indicators: Whether tenure was 
uncertain, whether housing was overcrowded, 
whether roof was in a bad shape, and whether floors 
 0.4 
  [0.078] 
 31 
were in a bad shape. Higher values indicate worse 
housing conditions d) 
 
household size  Average number of persons living in a household in 
1992 d) 
 6.3 
  [0.42] 
emigration  Share of households in 1992 in which a member 
lived in a different country d) 
 0.13 
  [0.077] 
remittances  Share of households in 1992 that had received 
international remittances during the previous 12 
months d) 
 0.15 
  [0.084] 
     
B) Annual data 
homicides  Annual homicide rates at the municipal level per 
100 thsnd. (1999 to 2015) h) 
 37 
  [42] 
per capita VAT  Value added text per capita at the municipal level 
(2001 to 2015) i) 
 65 
  [437] 
population size  Population projections at the municipal level (1999 
to 2015) j) 
 23729 
  [43372] 
 
The table provides mean values and standard deviations in squared brackets for a maximum of 262 
Salvadoran municipalities. Sources: a) NAID at UCLA, see Hinojosa (2011); b) US Department of Justice-
Federal Bureau of Investigation, via US Census Bureau (2017); c) Mesa tripartida (Policia Nacional, the 
Instituto de Medicina Legal and the public prosecutor’s department fiscalía) in El Salvador d) Digestyc, 
Censo de Población y Vivienda 1992; e) Construction Division of the US Census, via Census Bureau (2017); 
f) 1980 Population Census, via US Census Bureau (2017); g) Carcach (2008); h) Instituto de Medicina Legal de 
El Salvador. Anuarios Estadísticos. Varios Años i) Ministerio de Hacienda de El Salvador, Dirección de 
Impuestos Internos; j) Digestyc/UNFPA/Cepal, Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población. Municipal 2005-
2025 (San Salvador, 2014); and Digestyc, Proyección de Población por año calendario, según departamento, 







Annex 2: Exposure to US Violence and Gang-Related Homicides (Tobit MLE and 
Spatial Lag Model) 
 Estimated Gang Violence 
 Tobit MLE  Spatial Lag Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
(Intercept) -5 -1.7 -4.3 83 57  -53 
[11] [8.8] [14] [65] [82]  [87] 
exposure US violence 90*** 84*** 69** 65* 57*  58 ** 
[29] [22] [31] [34] [33]  [26] 
exposure housing costs     0.45  0.38 
    [1.1]  [1.2] 
exposure Latin population     94  220 
    [110]  [150] 
historical homicide rates    -0.6 -0.76  1.1 
   [1.4] [1.5]  [1.8] 
analphabetism    9.1 14  -15 
   [52] [53]  [44] 
child work    58 66  -15 
   [75] [74]  [60] 
population size    -3.8 -3.8  0.15 
   [3.8] [3.7]  [2.9] 
population density    0.00021 0.00052  0.0029 
   [0.0016] [0.0016]  [0.0031] 
housing quality    25 29  78 
   [69] [68]  [60] 
household size    -14* -13*  -1.9 
   [7.6] [7.6]  [8.3] 
emigration    -100 -100  -110 
   [83] [84]  [79] 
remittances    130 130  110 
   [84] [85]  [75] 
rho (spatial lag)       -0.035 
      [0.17] 
department fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes  no 
destination  ctrl (NYC, 
Wash., Long Isl.) 
no no no yes no  no 
sample full pop>10^3 full full full  full 
degrees of freedom 252 111 239 223 224  236 
Left censored 47 15 47 45 45  0 
AIC 2184 950 2191 2175 2175  2616 
Log Likelihood -1088.9 -471.79 -1079.52 -1059.43 -1060.41  -1293.93 
Tobit MLE uses a left-truncated dependent variable. The spatial lag model takes into account possible 
correlation of violence between k municipalities sharing common borders. Then, a binary weighting 
matrix is applied to the list of neighbors in order to identify spatial lags for each municipality j. 
Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are given in squared brackets. The dependent variable is an 
estimation of gang-related killings (drop in homicide rates during truce). Stars denote statistical 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
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